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Abstract 
Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality has been hugely influential in sociology and 
other disciplinary fields. However, its application has been criticised by those who suggest it 
neglects agency, and gives overwhelming power to governmental discourses in constituting 
subjectivities, determining behaviour, and reproducing social reality. Drawing on 
posthumously translated lecture transcripts, we suggest that Foucault’s nascent concept of 
pastoral power offers a route to a better conceptualisation of the relationship between discourse, 
subjectivity and agency, and a means of understanding the (contested, non-determinate, social) 
process through which governmental discourses are shaped, disseminated, and translated into 
action. We offer empirical examples from our work in healthcare of how this process takes 
place, present a model of the key mechanisms through which contemporary pastoral power 
operates, and suggest future research avenues for refining, developing or contesting this model. 
Introduction 
New translations of the works of Michel Foucault, most notably his lectures at the Collège de 
France, have prompted a renewed interest in Foucault’s oeuvre, and a reappraisal of the work 
of scholars who have developed Foucauldian ideas since his death. The lectures offer a glimpse 
of the direction of Foucault’s thinking towards the end of his life, and some elucidation of 
concepts that were presented only in preliminary form in his previously published work. In this 
paper, we build on one of these concepts—pastoral power—with a view to addressing a set of 
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critiques that have been levelled at both Foucault himself and his followers in the 
‘Governmentality School’ over the last 30 years: their (alleged) inattention to human agency, 
to the means by which discursive power translates into the formation and self-formation of 
subjects, and to the role of experts and expertise in this process. We suggest that Foucault’s 
notion of pastoral power offers a promising foundation for beginning to answer such critiques. 
We present and discuss an elaborated model of the operation of pastoral power previously put 
forward elsewhere (Waring and Martin 2016), offer an empirical demonstration of the 
application and analytical advantage of this model with examples from healthcare, and discuss 
its potential utility in wider contexts. 
Foucault outlined his concept of pastoral power in several places, including his lectures 
on neoliberal governmentality, on confession, and in his essay on ‘The subject and power’ 
(Foucault 1982). Pastoral power is presented as distinctive in the role it bestows on certain 
individuals—pastors—in instructing, caring for, and deriving legitimacy from the communities 
they serve. Pastoral power is distinctive in the way it attends to the wellbeing and moral 
propriety of both individuals and communities simultaneously, and thus offers ‘a tricky 
combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and of totalization 
procedures’ (Foucault 1982: 782). While its roots were in Christian institutions, Foucault 
argued that the Western state inherited and developed pastoral power, such that ‘the 
multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral power focused the development of knowledge 
of man around two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the 
other, analytical, concerning the individual’ (Foucault 1982: 784). One can hear echoes of the 
more widely known concept of governmentality, which Foucault was developing in the same 
period. Indeed elsewhere, he describes pastoral power as ‘a prelude to what I have called 
governmentality through the constitution of a specific subject, of a subject whose merits are 
analytically identified, who is subjected in continuous networks of obedience, and who is 
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subjectified through the compulsory extraction of truth’ (Foucault 2007a: 184–5). The lectures 
from the late 1970s and early 1980s (Foucault 2007a, 2008) offer a sense of how his various 
related inquiries of the period might interact and coalesce—and provide, we argue, building 
blocks for further theoretical development. We pick this point up later in the paper, but first, 
we outline the theory of governmentality, the way it has been developed by disciples of 
Foucault, and prominent criticisms of its perceived limitations. 
Governmentality and its critics 
The contours of the Governmentality School are well known, but it is worth briefly rehearsing 
some of the key features of neoliberal governmentality that Foucault himself identified, as 
developed subsequently by others. Foucault identified a crucial break between classical 
liberalism and neoliberalism in the way that the latter posited the market as the model of 
interaction for all social relationships. Whereas classical liberalism sees its task as ‘freeing an 
empty space’ (the market) from interference, neoliberalism’s project is actively interventionist: 
it involves ‘taking the formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them 
to, projecting them on to, a general art of government’ (Foucault 2008: 131). The intended 
outcome is the reorientation of state activity and social relations towards the economic, and 
correspondingly, the constitution of a new human subject, homo economicus, who conceives 
of herself in terms of economic optimisation and maximisation. As Brown (2015: 65) 
summarises, paraphrasing and then directly quoting Foucault, ‘every subject is rendered as 
entrepreneurial, no matter how small, impoverished, or without resources, and every aspect of 
human existence is produced as an entrepreneurial one. “The individual’s life itself—with his 
relationships to private property…with his family, household, insurance, and retirement—must 
make him into a sort of permanent and multiple enterprise” [Foucault 2008].’ 
These ideas formed the basis for a large body of work on governmentality in late 
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modernity that flourished in the 1990s and remains influential today. Central to this body of 
literature (often referred to as the Governmentality School) is a reading of Foucault that 
emphasises the decentred nature of power in contemporary societies, and rejects the notion that 
governmental power can be traced back, even in the final instance, to the state (Jessop 2007). 
Rather, governmentality is a form of power ‘without a centre, or rather with multiple centres, 
power that [is] productive of meanings, of interventions, of entities, of processes, of objects, of 
written traces and of lives’ (Rose and Miller 2008: 9). This literature draws attention to the way 
contemporary regimes of power rely less on externally imposed discipline and more on 
distributed technologies and discourses that act through an individual’s own freedom (eg Dean 
2003; Rose and Miller 1992). These works make a persuasive case for the power of discourses 
that constitute subjectivities by ruling through, not over, individual liberty. But they have been 
met with fierce counter-arguments, particularly from authors who find an anti-humanist or even 
structuralist logic in the notion that discourse constitutes subjectivity. For presentational 
purposes we group these interlinked critiques under three headings: the problem of agency; 
subjectification as a one-way, linear process; and the missing conduits of governmental power. 
In presenting these below, we seek to summarise critiques of the way that the theory of 
governmentality has been developed by followers of Foucault following his death, while also 
indicating how contradictions or lacunae in Foucault’s published work have contributed to 
these perceived weaknesses. 
1. The problem of agency 
Most fundamentally, several critiques see in the writings of the Governmentality School an 
obscuring or even a rejection of the role of human agency in the production, reproduction and 
transformation of social relations. Caldwell (2005: 104) argues that Foucauldian writers 
‘eliminate or submerge “agency” in discursive practices,’ resulting in ‘passive “subjects” who 
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are the conduits, bearers or sites of discourses of power/knowledge’ (Caldwell 2007: 770). For 
Bevir (2011: 462), governmentality scholars seem ‘reluctant’ to recognise autonomous agency, 
preferring instead ‘reified and monolithic accounts of modern power, with little sensitivity to 
diversity, heterogeneity and resistance within and over time.’ Subjects are thus marginalised, 
such that ‘any sense of agency lies primarily within discourse, language and calculation’ 
(Newton 1998: 429). 
Certainly, some of the issues highlighted by critics of the Governmentality School do 
relate to silences in Foucault’s own work, which he was only beginning to fill at the time of his 
death. Central to Foucault’s mission in his later work was to problematise various received 
understandings of the subject. He sought both to decentre the grand subject of progressive 
accounts of human history, such as the proletariat of Marxist historiography, and to destabilise 
any essentialist notion of an ahistorical, pre-discursive subjectivity that we might, through 
better self-understanding or by escaping the shackles of modernity, be able to recover. In 
essence, Foucault was arguing, there is no essence to human subjectivity, and so individual 
human subjects have a much greater autonomy in authoring themselves than Enlightenment 
thinking would suggest—if they can only see it. Thus Foucault’s self-declared ambition in this 
intellectual pursuit was to make visible alternative ways of being: ‘my role,’ he said in a late 
interview (Martin 1988: 10), ‘is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that 
people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment 
during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed.’ 
In seeking to erase the essentialising mark of Enlightenment thinking from the human 
subject, however, Foucault also obscured the means by which the subject might inscribe for 
himself something different. Decoupled from an understanding of subjectivity as a product of 
nature, or of class consciousness, or of some other pre-discursive force, what resources might 
the individual subject employ in cultivating her own subjectivity? Are subjects genuinely left 
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‘freer than they feel’ to exercise their agency in defining themselves, or does the loss of such 
an anchor leave them adrift, without defence against the tides of discursive power that seek to 
define their subjectivities for them? Foucault’s response here, again intimated in his lectures 
and late writings, was that the route to self-formation—to alternative ways of being that might 
slip the shackles of dominant power relations—was to deploy the tools of the Enlightenment 
to alternative effect (Foucault 2007b). Contemporary human subjectivity may be the product 
of a historically constituted set of conditions and discourses, but immanent within this 
subjectivity is the capacity for critique and creativity, and the conception of how we might be 
other than what we are (Cadman 2010). Thus “new human capacities may come into existence 
as effects of forms of domination, only then to become bases of resistance to those same forms 
of domination” (Patton 1998: 71). Foucault’s own genealogical method perhaps represents the 
epitome of such a critical disposition born of existing power relations: the capacity for reason 
and critique bequeathed to us by Enlightenment thinking deployed to identify the conditions of 
possibility that gave rise to our present, to identify its contingencies and dependencies, and to 
conceive of alternative ways of being and thinking (Foucault 2007b; Tamboukou 1999; 
Thompson 2003).  
In this light, a pre-discursive subjectivity (a trans-historical notion of what it is to be 
human) is not a prerequisite for creative forms of agency that transcend the dominant power 
relations of the time. Nevertheless, writers in the Governmentality School have often been 
accused of failing to take this potential for agency seriously, painting instead ‘a phantasmatic 
picture-without-subjects’ (Jiménez-Anca 2013: 40) in which the individual subject is a ‘tabula 
rasa’ (Benhabib 1992: 217) whose identity and agency are nothing more than ‘the prime effects 
of power’ (Foucault 1980, quoted in Bacchi 2005: 200): the product of governmentality. 
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2. Subjectification as a linear, one-way process 
Implicit in the critiques above are challenges to governmentality theorists’ assumptions about 
how governing discourses translate into subjective identity and agency. While Foucault’s 
intention may have been to show people that they are freer than they realise, the focus of writers 
in the Governmentality School has largely been on how, under conditions of late modernity, 
governing discourses infiltrate and occupy people’s subjectivities and self-conceptions (Rose 
and Miller 1992). Yet exactly how this infiltration occurs is left implicit. Foucault’s earlier 
work, such as his examination of disciplinary power (Foucault 1979), presents a clear, 
empirically visible route through which ‘normal’ conduct is defined and imposed on its 
subjects. The means by which governmental power translates into subjectivity, however, is not 
made so clear. For critics, a by-product of governmentality’s anti-humanist construction of 
agency is a failure to put forward an adequate conceptualisation of how powerful discourses 
come to permeate individual subjectivities. Bevir (2011: 462) notes a strategic silence on such 
issues, with governmentality theorists deploying ‘passive sentences and abstract nouns’ to 
sidestep the question of exactly how subjectification happens. 
Again, the translations of the Collège de France lectures throw new light on the process 
of subjectification under liberal governmentality as Foucault saw it, as a fostering of particular 
dispositions that include the capacity for critique and questioning. As Cadman (2010: 548) 
argues, however, much of the governmentality literature sees governmentality as stifling “the 
critical attitude by absorbing it a priori into its own rationality,” such that freedom becomes 
“an effective artefact of government.” Thus the impression from this literature is often that the 
‘policies, practices and techniques of rule [are] completed projects’ (Rutherford 2007: 300), 
with a linear, one-way relationship from discourses of governmental power, through docile 
subjectivities permeated by those discourses, to social consequences. The enactment of their 
freedom by the subjects of liberal governmentality is often thus invisible in such accounts. 
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Prominent governmentality scholars have defended their emphasis, arguing that the 
proper focus of the Governmentality School is indeed the texts of government rather than the 
tricky issue of how they translate into conduct: ‘if the alternative is thought to be the 
sociological study of how programs are actually implemented, [… then] governmental analysis 
does not aspire to be such a sociology’ (Rose et al. 2006: 100). Yet there is truth in O’Malley 
et al.’s (1997: 510) earlier critique of the Governmentality School’s exclusive focus on 
‘mentalities of rulers, a much more restricted inquiry than the institutions, procedures and 
practices of government found in Foucault’s earlier work.’ Real practices of government are 
found not in dominant discourses alone, but in the way these articulate, in often unpredictable 
ways, with local practices, subaltern discourses, and the subjective agency of individuals using 
their faculty for critique and self-formation (Foucault 2007b; Thompson 2003). 
3. The missing conduits of governmental power 
While proponents such as Rose might see the question of ‘implementation’ as beyond the remit 
of governmentality scholarship (Rose et al. 2006), they do nevertheless offer some comment 
on the role of certain intermediary agents who might be critical in the process by which 
discourses come to permeate subjectivities. In deliberately decentring the role of the state and 
of sovereign or disciplinary power in ensuring compliant subjects, governmentality scholars 
inevitably pose the question of how else governmental discourses might be transmitted into 
individuals’ subjectivities, identities and actions. However, the answers they give to these 
questions are not always satisfactory. Rose and Miller (1992: 180) allude to the critical role of 
‘the activities and calculations of a proliferation of independent agents’ who operate at arm’s 
length from the state in perpetuating governmental discourses: ‘philanthropists, doctors, 
hygienists, managers, planners, parents and social workers,’ among others. These agents 
intervene between ‘political strategies’ and ‘free citizens’ in order to ‘modulate events, 
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decisions and actions in the economy, the family, the private firm, and the conduct of the 
individual person’ (Rose and Miller 1992: 180). Conversely, such intermediaries also help to 
inform the construction and propagation of governmental discourses themselves: Rose (1999: 
189) signals the role of ‘experts of community’ who ‘advise on how communities and citizens 
might be governed in terms of their values, and how their values shape the ways they govern 
themselves.’ 
Yet the governmentality literature offers no more than a sketch of these instrumental 
conduits in the flow of governmental discourses ‘down’ into individual and collective 
subjectivities, and back ‘up’ into governmental discourses—feedback that might act as a 
corrective or realignment and thus ensure the continued effectiveness of governmentality as a 
mode of rule. Again, this may reflect Rose et al.’s (2006) declared position that questions of 
‘implementation’ fall outside the Governmentality School’s sphere of interest—or 
alternatively, it may reflect an under-theorisation of the mechanics of governmental rationality, 
and how power relationships beyond those of domination might operate in practice (Patton 
1998). Either way, it seems an important lacuna if we are better to conceptualise the operation 
of governmentality in contemporary society, including both the processes by which 
subjectivities are (re)constituted by discourse, and the means by which governmentality self-
regulates and remains stable. 
Theorising the operation of governmentality: the promise of pastoral power 
As noted above, Foucault’s (1982) writing on pastoral power outlines, but does not describe in 
detail, a connection with governmentality. Other authors have deployed the concept of pastoral 
power within a governmentality framework, but have used it relatively descriptively, to 
connote expert power, without examining the constitution, position and identities of these 
‘pastors’, and their relationships to their ‘flocks’ (eg Bejerot and Hasselbladh 2011; Bell and 
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Taylor 2003; Howley and Hartnett 1992; Wilson 2001). The publication of the Collège de 
France lectures, in which Foucault provided a more thorough scoping of pastoral power, 
permits a reappraisal of the concept, and the opportunity to address some of the limitations of 
the empirical application of governmentality theory as set out above. 
In his 1977-78 lectures, Foucault (2007a) explicitly positions pastoral power in relation 
to the framework of governmentality. He portrays the pastoral power of the Church as a kind 
of proto-governmental regime which foreshadows the simultaneous focus on individual and 
population characteristic of neoliberal governmentality. Foucault (2007a: 169–71) fleshes out 
the role of the pastor, outlining four principles for the pastor’s conduct: ‘analytical 
responsibility’ (the pastor must account for the behaviour of all of the ‘flock’, especially ‘stray 
sheep’); ‘exhaustive and instantaneous transfer’ (the moral behaviour of the flock is the pastor’s 
responsibility); ‘sacrificial reversal’ (pastors must be willing to sacrifice themselves for their 
flock); and ‘alternate correspondence’ (pastors’ standing with the Church is enhanced most 
where they forge appropriate behaviours among the most sinful communities). Finally, pastoral 
power combines the disciplinary and subjectifying forms of power that Foucault examined in 
his earlier and later works respectively. On the one hand, the pastor is a ‘relay’ of surveillance 
and discipline; on the other, the pastor promotes self-reflexive, self-governing subjects. 
Combining the content of his lectures with that of his written work, we can begin to plot 
the contours of pastoral power as not just a precursor to, but also a technology of, 
governmentality. Foucault (1982: 784) states that, in its contemporary form, pastoral power 
extends beyond the Church to encompass a whole range of actors, supported by ‘a multitude 
of institutions,’ with the objective of worldly achievements such as health, wealth and 
wellbeing, rather than posthumous salvation. The lectures point towards a form of power that 
is intrinsically social, built on an interdependent relationship between pastor and congregation. 
In essence, pastoral power might be one means whereby the connection between governmental 
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discourses and the constitution of subjects is effected—through the embodied, empirically 
visible agency of pastoral actors in concrete relationships of power with one another, not 
through some neglected, invisible, yet apparently all-encompassing discursive power. This 
understanding diverges significantly from the way in which the concept has been applied in the 
existing literature. Broadly, pastoral power has been equated with expertise (eg Wilson 2001) 
or surveillance (eg Howley and Hartnett 1992), without accounting for the integral connection 
between pastor and flock that is central to the descriptions given in Foucault’s (2007a) lectures. 
We have previously proposed a model of the operation of contemporary pastoral power 
(Waring and Martin 2016). Briefly, this model suggests that the work of pastors encompasses 
four principal activities: ‘constructive practices’, whereby pastors draw on textual and other 
sources of information that embody governmental discourses and—crucially—work to 
translate them for their own communities; ‘inscription practices’, whereby pastors engage in 
dialogue with their communities to articulate, legitimise and normalise a regime of truth and 
ensure its adoption; ‘collective practices’, whereby pastors seek to act as an integral part of 
their communities to embed and reproduce the new values and behaviours vaunted in 
governmental discourse and ostracise, then reintegrate, individuals who deviate; and 
‘inspection practices’, whereby pastors adopt a more disciplinary approach to advancing the 
adoption of appropriate subjectivities in both their communities and themselves.  
We developed this model through secondary analysis of empirical studies of the work of 
clinical and non-clinical leaders in healthcare, and the professional communities within which 
they operate (Waring and Martin 2016). Healthcare offers a rich area in which to develop such 
analyses. As an organisational field it typifies the array of actors and relationships that Rose 
and Miller (1992) describe in their genealogy of contemporary welfare and social government, 
with experts (doctors and other professionals) acting at arm’s length from the state, in roles that 
are increasingly constructed in terms of advice and counsel to autonomous subjects, rather than 
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the more paternalistic, disciplinary relationship that once characterised medical care (Foucault 
1973). Doctors’ interactions with one another, too, are characterised less by relations of 
command and authority than by the professional ‘collegium’: an ‘economy of regard’ (Offer 
1997) in which persuasion, peer regard, and informal sanction are the principal currencies 
(Martin et al. 2015). The distinguishing characteristics of healthcare, then, make it a potentially 
telling setting in which to undertake such analyses, particularly in terms of the increasingly 
complex relationships among a diversity of actors endowed with autonomy by contemporary 
governmentality, and thus the need for a framework that can account for the importance of 
social relationships in the production and reproduction of subjectivities and actions. 
In the remainder of this paper, we suggest that the model of pastoral power might offer 
such a promising conceptual framework that begins to counter the critiques of governmentality 
summarised above, not just in healthcare but in other fields too. It offers, we argue, a  basis for 
understanding how governmental discourses come to infuse the identities and activities of 
individuals and communities, how the multiple and sometimes competing discourses that 
characterise late modernity are prioritised and reconciled, and how governmentality itself is 
maintained, reproduced and adapted through time. 
Rethinking governmentality through pastoral power 
Our understanding of pastoral power begins to answer the critiques above by providing a 
conceptualisation of the relationship between subjectivity formation, at the individual and 
collective level, and discursive power; and also of the role of pastors as conduits and key agents 
in this relationship. It thus offers an alternative lens on the processes covered by the 
Governmentality School, focusing on the active work of pastors and other agents rather than 
taking the supremacy of governmental discourses for granted. It responds directly to critics 
such as Bevir (2013: 42) who perceive in governmentality scholarship an explanatory reliance 
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on the ill-articulated, ‘mysterious, even occult, impact of an overarching “individualizing 
power”,’ and call instead for ‘examples of particular agents applying norms in creative ways 
that transform power relations’ (Bevir 2013: 38). Pastoral power shifts attention to the question 
of how discourses translate into subjectivity, action and material consequence—and to the 
active role of agents (pastors and others) in this process. We offer three examples from the 
governmentality literature to highlight its limitations in this regard, and to suggest how a focus 
on pastors and pastoral power might assist in reasserting the role of agency and specific agents 
in translating discourses into subjectivities and practices. 
First, Donzelot’s (1991) offers a historical account of the discourse of ‘pleasure in work’ 
(the notion that productivity, labour relations, and worker satisfaction might be improved 
through more humanistic, less confrontational organisational practices). He covers the rise of 
this discourse, from its origins in the work of scholars in the traditions of human relations and 
organisation development, to its co-optation into French labour policy. He presents a 
confluence of interests among employers, government and trades unions that give rise to 
dominant current discourses about the importance of workplace wellbeing, rehabilitation of 
those unable to work, and an alliance between management and workforce in the interests of 
productivity and progress. This is a quintessential Governmentality School account, which 
shows how social policy has moved towards ‘thinking in terms of target groups, classifying 
populations according to the modes of care specifically appropriate for them, thus enabling 
these modes of care to be more rationally distributed so as to forestall the most expensive 
consequences [to economy and society] in subsequent individual treatment of illness’ 
(Donzelot 1991: 277). This shift reflects a wider governmentality in which ‘prevention clearly 
comes to assume the highest priority, turning the national territory into a field for planned 
policies of vaccination, regulation and control, and making society into the site of mobilization 
of each individual for the management of his own health and promotion of community 
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responsiveness to health problems’ (Donzelot 1991: 278).  
It is a compelling, well researched and convincing genealogy of this discourse; despite 
its age and its exclusive focus on French social history, it offers an insightful analytical 
framework for contemporary social policy developments in different contexts, such as welfare-
to-work schemes, social-inclusion policies that see paid employment as the route to ensuring 
the integration of ‘problem’ groups such as single mothers, and citizen ‘activation’ (Clarke 
2005). What it does not address (and does not seek to address) is the contestation of the 
genealogical emergence of these discourses at any level, from the construction of policy, 
through its implementation by professional and managerial intermediaries, to the response of 
the ‘target groups’ on the receiving end, those to be supported and reintegrated into productive 
roles in the workforce. This means that the account falls short of the claim that Donzelot makes 
for it: that it demonstrates ‘a mobilization (in every sense of the word), rather than a 
reinforcement, of the psychological subject: the crucial factor is not so much a shifting of the 
frontiers between the normal and the pathological, as the making of these frontiers into items 
negotiable within society in terms of a pervasive reality-principle’ (Donzelot 1991: 280). 
Donzelot claims, then, to have evidenced a remaking of the individual subject, but because his 
account focuses on the ‘conditions of emergence’ (the genealogy) of these discourses, to the 
neglect of their realisation in actual social relations, actions and identities, it can do no such 
thing. The focus on the rise of the discourse alone, and its establishment as a governing 
principle for a coalition of actors that spans government, employers and unions, results in the 
misrepresentation of discursive dominance as material impact on the agency of the actors it 
seeks to enrol. Exemplifying the points made by the Governmentality School’s critics, the study 
conflates neoliberal consensus with pervasive impact on subjectivities. It assumes that such a 
discursive shift translates automatically into the subjectivity, identity, will and behaviour of 
individuals. In contrast, an approach informed by pastoral power might seek to account for 
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both the presence and potential power of discourses of this kind and the interpretive work of 
pastors and others in translating it into action (or not): in this case, the role of workplace 
managers, family doctors, social workers, benefits officers and others in mediating policy and 
potentially giving rise to material consequences that are quite different from what might be 
suggested by a historically informed focus on governmental discourse alone. 
A similar critique might be made of Knights and Collinson’s (1987) comparative analysis 
of the impact of the discourses of managerial psychology and financial accounting on male, 
blue-collar workers in a manufacturing firm. Intriguingly, they suggest that the first discourse 
(managerial psychology) fails to resonate with those on the shop floor, whereas the second 
(financial accounting) is accepted unproblematically and comes to align with their 
subjectivities. Thus we have an unusual example in the Foucauldian literature of a powerful 
discourse that fails to land with the subjects targeted. Knights and Collinson’s explanation for 
this disparity is that managerial psychology was out of line with the wider, societal discourses 
permeating these workers’ sense of self: it was ‘incompatible with [workers’] “machoism” and 
“down to earth” practical sense of reality’ (Knights and Collinson 1987: 459). In contrast, the 
power of the discourse of financial discipline—which resulted in a surprising absence of 
resistance to a proposed redundancy programme—derived from its ‘compatibility with the 
dominant unambiguously, materialistic and gender differentiated values of male manual 
workers on the shopfloor’ (Knights and Collinson 1987: 472), and the individualistic, self-
dependent identities to which they aspired. In essence, Knights and Collinson (1987: 474) 
argue, the key determinant of the relative success of the two discourses was their alignment 
with governmental discourses of the enterprising, self-actualising individual: ‘largely as a 
result of a continuous engagement in the illusion of freedom that is promised in the potential 
achievement of financial independence, the modern labourer is constituted much like the 
bourgeoisie as a materially self-interested subject.’ 
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Again, Knights and Collinson’s (1987) account is theoretically rich and compellingly 
presented, but again, it offers little by way of an understanding of how the discourses of 
individual autonomy and financial discipline become so pervasive. In fact, they are able to 
present lots of empirical examples of the rejection of management psychology discourse by the 
workers in their study, but no parallel examples of how the discourse of financial discipline is 
taken up and promulgated by the same group. Again, this is perhaps because this was not 
Knights and Collinson’s primary objective in writing their paper—but again, we would argue 
that it leaves an important part of the story untold. What were the mechanisms by which these 
discourses came to permeate subjectivities? Who or what were the critical intermediaries in the 
passage from discourse to subjectivity? Knights and Collinson highlight that the redundancy 
programme and the associated discourse of financial discipline did not go completely 
unresisted on the shop floor, with trade union stewards attempting unsuccessfully to mobilise 
their colleagues. This raises further questions: why were these stewards, who might also be 
conceptualised as pastors of sorts, unsuccessful in this endeavour when they had previously 
successfully agitated for industrial action? Again, further attention to the mechanisms of 
governmentality, of a kind that might be achieved through the lens of pastoral power, offers 
potential illumination of these issues, and the prospect of moving beyond analyses in which 
the dominance of certain powerful discourses is taken for granted. 
Our third example is the analysis of risk, governance and the new public health put 
forward by Petersen (1997; see also Petersen and Lupton 1996). Drawing on wider 
governmentality scholarship, Petersen (1997) argues that the way in which the new public 
health invokes multiple ‘risk factors’ to predict ill health or other negative social outcomes 
results in a focus on both populations and ‘at risk’ individuals for whom multiple factors 
intersect. This gives rise to both a privatisation of risk management, leaving individuals 
responsible for managing their own risk factors, but also, Petersen (1997: 204) argues, a 
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reshaping of subjectivity, whereby ‘being a “healthy”, “responsible”, citizen entails new kinds 
of detailed work on the self and new interpersonal demands and responsibilities.’ Abiding by 
expert advice on how best to maintain one’s health, wellbeing and productivity becomes an 
expectation incumbent on every subject, such that ‘individuals whose conduct is deemed 
contrary to the pursuit of a ‘risk-free’ existence are likely to be seen, and to see themselves, as 
lacking self-control, and as therefore not fulfilling their duties as fully autonomous, responsible 
citizens’ (Petersen 1997: 198). 
The role of experts themselves is acknowledged in this account, but again, little fleshed 
out. Petersen (1997: 197) argues that the emergent profession of health promotion is at the 
centre of ‘a multi-levelled and multi-organisational network of surveillance and regulatory 
practices,’ in which health promoters have the task of co-ordinating multiple forms of expert 
knowledge and marshalling these ‘prodigious resources’ towards the promotion of public 
health and the targeting of at risk individuals. But what they do and how they do it is 
unexamined, leaving the health promoter as little more than a neutral conduit that aggregates 
and disseminates public health discourse. Similarly, while Petersen (1997: 194) acknowledges 
‘the agency of subjects’ and their ability ‘to exercise a regulated autonomy,’ this notion is 
underdeveloped, and we are left again with the impression of a process whereby neoliberal 
governmentality demands that individuals engage in a highly specified form of self-
governance, and subjects unreflexively comply.  
Each of the examples presented above is a worthy piece of scholarship, which has 
advanced our understanding of the logics and ambitions of contemporary rule in imaginative 
ways. However, each also exemplifies the governmentality literature in its relative neglect of 
how governmental discourses translate into the subjectivity and agency of contemporary 
subjects. It may (not unreasonably) be objected that authors in the governmentality tradition 
can only do so much within the confines of a journal article or book chapter to expand the 
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scope of their analysis in this direction. To varying degrees, these examples do acknowledge 
the importance of intermediaries such as experts, and of the subjective agency of the targeted 
populations—but then pay so little attention to the implications of these claims that the 
impression they give is of a discursive power whose impact on subjects is overwhelming, 
direct, and complete. Thus our point here is not that these articles in particular have little to 
say about how discourse influences subjectivities, and on the role of intermediaries and the 
agency of subjects in this process, but that they typify a wider literature that is silent on this 
issue—and that this silence is problematic given a desire to understand not just the construction 
of the texts of government but their (perhaps inconsistent, incomplete) impact on subjects, 
organisations and communities. 
Pastoral power’s potential 
In contrast, the framework of pastoral power focuses attention on exactly this silence, but in a 
way that remains informed by an understanding of governmental rationality deriving from 
Foucault and the Governmentality School. We offer two examples from our own work with a 
view to articulating how such a view might extend the analytical scope of governmentality, and 
in the process begin to answer the criticisms that scholars such as Caldwell (2005, 2007), 
Newton (1998) and Bevir (2011). Our principal ambition here is to re-state our previously 
presented model (Waring and Martin 2016), demonstrate its operation through these worked 
empirical examples, and show how it starts to take seriously the process whereby 
governmentality is realised and reproduced socially, through the power relationships of an 
array of actors on the ground. 
The first example (Martin et al. 2013) examines the role of senior hospital clinicians in 
translating powerful discourses around the need for improvement in the quality of care into 
routine practice among their peers. Healthcare quality is a major theme of current policy in 
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healthcare systems worldwide, and a number of analyses previously have used Foucauldian 
approaches to examine how such discourses act on clinical subjectivities so that doctors ‘accept 
a responsibility to seek ways of transforming their position themselves’ (Flynn 2002: 163) or 
embrace ‘an entrepreneurial, energetic, quality orientated and value led […] style’ (Ferlie et al. 
2012: 346). Where our approach differs is on its focus on key intermediaries in the process, 
belying any simple understanding of ‘discursive constitution’ of subjectivities. Rather, these 
intermediaries—‘pastors’—are active in the process of translation of discourse into practice, 
interrogating prescribed policies, finding their strengths and weaknesses, and using their 
knowledge of their peers and of the systems at their disposal to reflexively develop approaches 
to realise policy and influence their colleagues’ dispositions. This involved a combination of 
strategies that sought to establish the legitimacy of care quality as a priority and impress upon 
colleagues their own (personal and collective) responsibility to change behaviour to improve 
it. In line with governmentality theory, this combined attention to the population (in terms of 
the statistical performance of the clinical workforce as a whole) and the individual (in terms of 
a focus on those whose performance appeared to fall short of expectations). Importantly, 
however, it was about more than simply providing data or seeking to incentivise improvement: 
it involved active efforts to align a new discourse of quality with prior, professionally held 
notions of what it was to be a good clinician. Thus it was ‘not a simple matter of power acting 
on the individual subject. Rather, it was about the creation of spaces in which clinicians could 
interact and express their professionalism, and thereby envisage and enact new roles and 
relationships’ (Martin et al. 2013: 85). In other words, it was through the translational work of 
senior clinicians (the pastor’s ‘inscriptive practices’), along with the social interactions among 
peers (the flock’s ‘collective practices’), that governmental discourses came to inhabit clinical 
subjectivities, not through any direct, irresistible influence of the discourse itself. And this 
implies that the power of the discourse itself resides not in its abstract, ‘textual’ state, but in its 
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reconstitution through the actions and interactions of the professional community. It follows 
that governmental power, such as it is, thus rests on its ongoing reconstruction through the 
inter-subjective work of those it seeks to affect. 
Our second example (Waring et al. 2016; Waring and Latif in press) examines the ways 
community pharmacists are increasingly required to act as pastors in promoting adherent 
patient subjectivities with regards the use of prescribed medicines. Research suggests that 
patients often fail to take newly prescribed medicines as instructed by their health 
professionals, leading to poor health, wasted resources, and additional treatment costs. As in 
other areas of healthcare, policy discourses construct patients as having greater responsibility 
for their health-related behaviours, in this case for taking their medicines as prescribed. As an 
example of Foucault’s governmentality, Waring et al. (2016) examine how these more adherent 
patient subjectivities are formed through the pastoral power of the community pharmacist. This 
shows that pharmacists are increasingly held responsible not only for dispensing prescribed 
medicines, but also providing patient education at the point of dispensing to promote patient 
adherence. Through the introduction of ‘advanced services’ in recent policy, new spaces or 
situations have been created in which patients and pharmacists interact to instruct and inspect 
patient behaviours in relation to their medicines. Waring et al. (2016) describe these encounters 
as having confessional-like qualities, where pharmacists compel patients to reflect upon their 
medicines-related behaviours and to account for inappropriate behaviour. By providing 
personalised education and instructions, they guide patients to take their medicines as expected, 
but more importantly, to better regulate their future conduct. This study brings to light the 
‘inscriptive practices’ of community pharmacists as they encourage patients to internalise and 
normalise new expectations for their health-related behaviour, and also the ‘inspection 
practices’ of community pharmacists in monitoring and overseeing continued adherence. As 
such, the study suggests that pastoral power operates at the nexus of discipline and 
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subjectification, with pastors shaping desirable, self-governing subjectivities, and remaining 
active in the surveillance and monitoring of subject behaviours on an ongoing basis. Waring 
and Latif (in press) extend this analysis by highlighting the presence of multiple pastors and 
pastorates (for example, general practitioners and community pharmacists), whose regimes and 
relationships with their flocks sometimes align and sometimes conflict. This study highlights 
the agency of interconnected pastors, and also that of their subjects. Significantly, the tensions 
between pastors allows ‘patients to recognise and use the underlying competition between 
pastors and the plurality of the discursive field to justify counter-conduct. That is, subjects can 
invoke the guidance of one pastor, or alternate social discourses, to explain their counter-
conduct to the other’ (Waring and Latif in press: 14). This points to the existence of multiple 
discourses that seek to influence conduct that are not always compatible (as also seen in the 
example of Knights and Collinson 1987, above). It also points to the contingency of 
relationships of pastoral power, again highlighting that there is nothing predetermined or final 
about the influence of powerful governmental discourses on the constitution of subjectivities 
and the behaviour of subjects. 
Conclusion 
We argue that drawing on and developing Foucault’s notion of pastoral power presents an 
opportunity for refocusing and extending the governmentality perspective in ways that answer 
some of the criticisms made of the approach, and perhaps makes it more useful as a means of 
analysing governmental rationality in action, not just in the abstract. Our reading of the 
Governmentality School highlights, first, insufficient empirical or theoretical attention to 
agency; second, the tendency to see governmentality as a linear process of subjectification; and 
third, lack of analysis of the critical intermediaries of governmentality. By returning to 
Foucault’s wider work on governmentality and drawing, in particular, on his concept of 
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pastoral power, we seek to remedy these three analytical lacunae by showing the situated work 
of pastor-like actors in shaping the subjectivities of subjects through recursive forms of social 
interaction. 
Most basically, but most fundamentally, this model of pastoral power provides a means 
of conceptualising agency in governmentality that builds on the insights of Foucault in his 
lectures and other late writings that have not previously been fully apprehended in much of the 
governmentality literature (Cadman 2010; Foucault 2007b, 2008; Thompson 2003). In 
particular, it sees transmission of governmental ideas as taking place through pastoral actors 
with meaningful agency, and focuses on the activity that goes on within their communities to 
translate, adapt and embed governmental discourses in individual subjectivities and collective 
routines. As such, it offers a more socialised understanding of the operation of governmental 
rationality. It builds on Judith Butler’s (1997) proposition that discourse activates the subject 
and forms the basis for an ongoing process of inter-subjective constitution, proposing the 
communities of pastors and their flocks as a setting in which this takes place. It suggests one 
potential arena for the constitution and reconstitution of subjectivities through ‘the self-
conscious practices of subjects, even if those subjects come into being through the condition 
of subjection’ (Youdell 2006: 518). 
Second, pastoral power allows much more adequately for the possibility, and range of 
potential consequences, of resistance and contestation. In elaborating his theory of 
governmentality, Foucault put forward the notion of ‘counter conduct’, and the possibility of 
innovation and creativity in response to governmental power, but as Bevir (2011) notes, it is 
difficult to discern how this might arise given the totalising regime implied by much of the 
writing of the Governmentality School. Those taking inspiration from Foucault’s lectures and 
late writings have suggested that the Governmentality School’s conceptualisation of the 
‘freedom’ of the neoliberal subject is unnecessarily pessimistic: that a subject born of its time 
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has the capacity to conceive of alternative relationships of rule (Cadman 2010; Foucault 2007b; 
Patton 1998). Pastoral power’s focus on translation, dialogue and adaptation recentres the 
dialectical, local and contingent process through which subjectification operates, and through 
which subjects in their power relationships with one another can appropriate, adapt and alter 
the modes of rule to which they are subject. It thus provides a conceptual lens through which 
to study ruptures in governmentality and their consequences at the micro and macro levels. 
Third, many studies in governmentality tend to portray a monolithic, or at least co-
ordinated, body of governmental discourse that has a singular effect on its subjects. But it is 
difficult to argue that late modernity is characterised by a single, unified regime of truth; indeed 
Foucault (2008) himself argued for the coexistence of multiple truth claims, the inconsistencies 
between which are most visible at the genealogical disjunctures his work identified, but which 
remain present even at times of apparent accord. Again, the model of pastoral power has the 
potential to make visible the work involved in reconciling these discourses, or alternatively in 
selecting one over another, at the level of the community of interdependent actors (cf. Waring 
and Latif in press). 
This model of pastoral power should be deployed with caution. As Dean (2003: 131) 
argues, ‘the political shaping and self-shaping of individuals occur through singular practices 
of the regulation of conduct from discipline and civility to arts of existence found in and across 
different and definite locales, the problematisations that are linked with them, the goals they 
seek, the kinds of subjects they attempt to make or to become, and the diverse instrumentation 
they deploy.’ In other words, we should not expect to uncover a single, uniform technology of 
translation through which governmentality universally operates. Nevertheless, developed and 
applied judiciously, in building on the intimations in the breadth of Foucault’s later work, the 
concept of pastoral power might respond to critiques of the application of governmentality, by 
foregrounding the active, inter-subjective work of intermediaries and communities in adopting, 
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adapting, contesting and remaking regimes of truth. We suggest further empirical and 
theoretical work to further understand the dynamics of pastoral power as tentatively outlined 
our model (Waring and Martin 2016). This might include, for example, research looking more 
at the competition between pastors and the paradoxes this creates for subjectification; the ways 
pastors not only relate to communities of subjects, but also to the wider institutions and 
apparatus of power, including the state; and the ways pastors are themselves constituted and 
subjectified through parallel and recursive processes. 
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